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Paul Gilmour, University of Portsmouth
Abstract
Purpose – This article provides a critical overview of freeports’ trading operations 
and considers to what extent they may present a money-laundering and tax-evasion 
risk.
Design/methodology/approach – This study reviews the literature surrounding 
freeports and offers an up-to-date narrative of their potential money-laundering and 
tax-evasion activities. The paper relies on secondary data from published sources 
referencing peer-reviewed articles and ‘grey-literature’ material relating to freeports, 
offshore finance, and anti-money laundering control.
Findings – This study demonstrates the attractive trading advantages offered by 
freeports to enable enterprise and innovation. However, the article reveals that the 
secretive offshore space in which freeports operate also helps to obscure beneficial 
ownership and illicit trade-based practices that frustrate authorities’ efforts to trace 
laundered monies and recover government taxes. Despite freeports’ trade offerings, 
stronger regulation is needed to prevent them being abused for money-laundering 
and tax-evasion purposes.
Originality/Value – This study provides an important insight into the money-
laundering and tax-evasion risks presented by freeports and, in doing so, advances 
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1. Introduction
For many years, there has been an increasing trend for nations to introduce 
specialised trade zones within its territory free from economic and commercial 
restraint to invigorate the local economy and maintain fiscal dominance (Hakimian, 
2011). This strategy has included establishing onshore zones, known as ‘freeports’. 
Freeports are warehouses located within free-trade zones that lie within a country’s 
geographical border but are designated by that country’s government to be outside 
its normal customs regime (Webb, 2020). Freeports are typically located at nationally 
strategic hubs, such as air, rail, and seaports, to facilitate trade through the country. 
Freeports and the companies based within these zones enjoy several concessions, 
like cheaper import duties, suspended custom obligations, and reduced bureaucratic 
checks intended to streamline cross-border trade (Moiseienko et al., 2020; Webb, 
2020). Therefore, freeports seem to provide innovative trading advantages over 
other jurisdictions bound by stricter customs obligations and, thus, offer a more 
attractive environment through which to conduct business.   
However, there is concern that economic concessions and reduced regulatory 
oversight enjoyed by freeports allows criminals to misuse them for illicit purposes. 
According to Korver (2018), the art market, which relies on freeports for warehousing 
its goods, can be obscured through nondisclosure of beneficial ownership of assets 
transiting through international borders. Such secrecy can hinder authorities’ 
attempts to trace and recover illicit proceeds (Gilmour, 2020). Similarly, self-
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declaration practices occurring within freeports lend themselves to fraudulent over- 
or under-invoicing of goods; thus, enabling trade-based money laundering (Korver, 
2018). Therefore, the risks associated with freeports must be understood to 
strengthen anti-money laundering (AML) efforts. Yet, despite freeports’ possible 
benefits for global trade, little research has addressed how freeports might enable 
money laundering and tax evasion (Lavissière and Rodrigue, 2017).
This article considers freeports’ potential to enable money laundering and tax 
evasion. It highlights several overriding criminal methods that are enabled within 
freeports’ offshore space of regulatory concessions and, therefore, advances the 
scope in which offshore dealings are judged. This article argues that though 
freeports present an innovative platform through which successful trade can be 
enabled and maintained, their misuse for money-laundering and tax-evasion 
purposes raises justifiable concerns. This article concludes that further government 
oversight is needed to curb illegal activity through freeport zones.
2. What are freeports?
The idea of freeports being hubs relatively free of trading regulation has been long 
established: the first modern economic freeports were established at strategic South-
East Asian sea- and airports throughout the late 1960s (Sellick, 2020). Many 
freeports operate around the world, though, some of the most prominent now 
specialise in the storage of fine art, such as those in Beijing, Switzerland, and 
Monaco (Steiner, 2017, p. 356). As Steiner (2017, p. 354) has noted, Switzerland’s 
freeports, home to renowned auction houses, are instrumental to the success of the 
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Colchester (2015), freeports were originally conceived as temporary storage spaces 
free of taxes while goods were in transit to their onshore destination.
Korver (2018) recognised freeports as tactical depots intended as spaces to 
temporarily house valuable assets, like artwork, precious metals and gems, wine 
collections and antiques. However, Weeks (2020, p. 4) has stated that many art 
dealers now commonly exploit freeports’ beneficial goods-in-transit position to house 
their assets on a more permanent basis. This means, as long as the dealers’ goods 
remain within the freeports’ storage facility, those dealers are unaccountable for any 
duties (such as value-added taxes [VAT] or capital gains taxes) which would 
normally be applied upon export (Weeks, 2020; see also Schwarzkopf and Backsell, 
2020, p. 7). It also means those same goods would not be subject to the cross-
border scrutiny of authorities as other exported goods would be. For Weeks (2020), 
the exploitation of freeports in this way enables illicit activity, such as money 
laundering and tax evasion.
3. Freeports: indicators of developing global offshore capitalism?
Recent scholarship has conceptualised freeports as manifestations of offshore 
capitalism that has evolved throughout an increasingly globalised society (Lavissière 
and Rodrigue, 2017; Post and Calvão, 2020; Schwarzkopf and Backsell, 2020). 
Leyshon and Thrift (1997) argued that an increased mobility of capital across 
permeable state borders is key to progressive forms of capitalism. They also 
highlighted two causes of the global proliferation of privately held finance: (1) 
implementation of flawed fiscal regimes of Western governments that have tried to 
regulate and control capital; and (2), and the globalisation of monetary supplies and 
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freeports have arisen from the advent of offshore jurisdictions made necessary to 
spread and accumulate global wealth “no longer tied to colonial or national spaces”. 
Ogle (2017, p. 1446) similarly viewed the liberation and deregulation of financial 
markets being pivotal to the development of offshore capitalism. It is within such 
context that freeports have flourished.
The offshore nature of freeports means that wealthy business clients of luxury art 
and other assets held in freeport zones can avoid the restrictive regimes of their 
home countries (Weeks, 2020). For example, Weeks (2020, p. 5) explained how 
investors managed to avoid restrictions brought in by Germany’s 2016 Act on the 
Protection of Cultural Property that limited trade in antique art valued over €300,000. 
Consequently, owners of valuable art chose to shift their assets to freeports in 
neighbouring Switzerland and Luxembourg before the law was enacted. The 
dynamic shifts of global capital strengthened by the flexibility offered by freeports 
suggests freeports help to drive a global offshore-capitalist agenda.
However, literature on freeports has also conceptualised the regulatory space 
occupied by freeports as being contrary to free-market capitalism. Schwarzkopf and 
Backsell (2020) have argued that the offshore regulatory model in which freeports 
operate discourages capital mobility. They explain that the growth in freeports is 
indicative of a retrograde trend in global capitalism akin to medieval times 
(Schwarzkopf and Backsell, 2020). This concept seems plausible considering that 
freeports’ beneficial goods-in-transit position provides for assets to remain stored ‘in 
transit’ indefinitely – yet goods can be sold and purchased without ever leaving the 
storage facility and without tax being imposed (Helgadóttir, 2020; Post and Calvão, 
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capital flow. Such state of perpetuity opposes the liberalised economic policies of 
many Western governments that advocate freeports.
The following section considers to what extent freeports promote free trade and 
encourage commercial innovation.
4. Freeports’ benefits for trade and innovation.
Governments are constantly seeking new ways to boost foreign investment and 
support their nation’s economic prosperity and global trading repute. For instance, a 
state can bolster its fiscal and technological capability through Foreign Direct 
Investment [FDI], a process whereby an overseas investor establishes an influential 
interest within that state’s locality (Nketiah-Amponsah and Sarpong, 2020). State 
governments can also implement legal and practical measures, like tax incentives, 
and reduced trade barriers, towards attracting enterprise and overseas investment. 
Such incentives have propelled many areas, like Hong Kong, Singapore, and the 
Seychelles, to specialise in financial services for non-residents and to become 
globally dominate Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs; Chan and Lee, 2007). Around 
11 per cent of the Seychelles’ Gross Domestic Product, for example, derives from 
overseas investment protected by its attractive financial services market (Mugarura, 
2017).
In early 2020, the UK government published a consultation into proposals to create 
Freeports across the UK in an aim to stimulate the economy following Brexit. 
According to the publication, the main purpose of freeports is to facilitate trade and 
promote innovation and employment (HM Government, 2020, p. 10). Such literature 






























































administrative costs and controls (HM Government, 2020). For example, 
strengthened trade enables manufacturing companies to save on costs of 
administration and raw ingredients compared to external companies (Stojanovic, 
2020). Therefore, freeports act as zones that are advantageous for newly 
established companies to base their operations as the usual state custom controls, 
where the zone is geographically located, do not apply. 
Companies registered within a freeport benefit from tax relief which supports their 
capital growth. Also, reduced supervision within freeports provides a more private 
environment to conduct business and helps companies to better compete 
internationally (HM Government, 2020). A clear example can be seen with the 
Middle East, where the Jordanian port of Aqaba, designated a freeport in 1973, 
became a successful transit hub for trading, further strengthened at the time, by 
regional oil reserves. Today, the Jebel Ali freeport in the United Arabs Emirates 
accounts for a fifth of the country’s FDI and helps to support over 160,000 jobs (“The 
role of freezones”, 2013). Further, Steiner (2017, p. 355) noted that the area of 
Geneva in Switzerland has since profited some CHF 10 million each year after a 
freeport was established there. Such prosperity has helped the area resist the 
damaging impact of 2008’s global financial crisis (Steiner, 2017).
Lavissière and Rodrigue (2017) highlighted freeports’ arbitrage advantages. 
Arbitrage is the procedure in which investors can profit from concurrently buying and 
selling goods across different international markets. Such practices promote market 
productivity and maintains freeports’ competitive lead over other jurisdictions. It may 
also mean that nations seeking to remodel their trading links with others (such as, 
post-Brexit United Kingdom) can still prosper through the freeport model because 
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any future trade barriers would potentially further freeports’ arbitrage advantages 
(Lavissière and Rodrigue, 2017).
Nonetheless, the UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO) recently concluded that 
freeports offer little benefit when a country’s trade tariffs are already low (Winters 
and Holmes, 2020). Holmes (2019) pointed out that freeports do not free goods 
completely from tariffs – rather, they merely delay duty being imposed until the 
goods arrive at their destination. The trading benefits of freeports also depend on 
factors, such as capable labour and access to passage within the freeports 
(Stojanovic, 2020). Such questions raise doubt over whether freeports really do 
innovate economic growth. For Stojanovic (2020), freeports simply reroute current 
initiatives into freeport zones through an allure of tax relief; thus, burdening the 
taxpayer due to lost government revenue.
Holmes (2019) has argued that to realise any significant long-term benefits in 
freeports, governments must broaden the incentives that freeports offer (akin to 
‘enterprise zones’), rather than simply providing short-term duty-free access. For 
instance, designating the Isle of Dogs in London as an enterprise zone following the 
demise of the surrounding docks in 1982 provided much needed economic 
prosperity to the area. The zone gained government support beyond tax breaks, 
through relaxed development planning rules and improved infrastructure, leading to 
new employment in the area and neighbouring Canary Wharf (Holmes, 2019). 
Therefore, expanding freeports’ remit to better incentivise the surrounding local 






























































The next section explores the primary money-laundering and tax-evasion risks 
posed by freeports and considers the methods through which such illicit activities 
occur.
5. Money-laundering and tax-evasion risks.
5.1. Freeports help to conceal beneficial ownership.
Contemporary scholarship has argued that the secretive offshore space in which 
freeports operate helps to conceal beneficial ownership and, thus, promote 
money laundering and tax evasion (Financial Action Task Force [FATF], 2014; 
Korver, 2018; Moiseienko et al., 2020; Post and Calvão, 2020). The FATF (2014, 
p. 8) defined a beneficial owner as,
… the natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls a customer and/or 
the natural person on whose behalf a transaction is being conducted. It also 
includes those persons who exercise ultimate effective control over a legal 
person or arrangement.
In cases where the true beneficial owner cannot be identified, law-enforcement 
and tax authorities can find it difficult, if not impossible, to trace illicit proceeds 
and recover taxes connected to those entities or transactions (Transparency 
International UK [TI UK], 2017). This issue is compounded by law-enforcement 
authorities’ lack of understanding on the methods criminals use to conceal 
beneficial ownership using offshore jurisdictions (Gilmour, 2020; Yeoh, 2018; see 
also FATF, 2018).
Additionally, anonymous shell companies can be used as vehicles to launder 
money (Le Nguyen, 2018). Shell companies typically have no actual presence 
apart from a registered address and employ no real people. They create little or 






























































no independent financial worth and carry out no significant regular commercial 
endeavours (Gilmour, 2020; Pacini et al., 2019; Pacini and Stowell, 2020). Yet, 
they can be used to shift assets and substantial amounts of funds worldwide 
while offering the apparent legitimacy of a registered and fully functioning 
corporation (Pacini et al., 2019). However, the true beneficial owners of assets 
tied to those shell companies can remain hidden from interested parties, 
including the authorities. 
The linking of anonymous shell companies to form complex ownership structures 
can further obscure beneficial ownership and the source of assets based within 
freeports (Post and Calvão, 2020, p. 9). Pacini and Stowell (2020, p. 374) 
clarified that shell companies can be linked to various territories reinforcing the 
corporate structure’s anonymity and making it difficult for law-enforcement 
officials to decipher. This linking of shell companies also enables the corporates 
better access to global financial markets and to launder illicit money.
Furthermore, freeports’ offshore environment helps to distance the beneficial 
owner of assets from criminality and serves to further complicate illicit corporate 
structures (FATF, 2018). Steiner (2017, p. 363) explained that it is possible for 
illicit money to be laundered through the sale of goods stored in freeports, such 
as artwork. The customer who purchases the art using illicit cash could then store 
the goods within a freeport without having to disclose the real owner, by simply 
listing an agent responsible for their disposal on the inventory instead. Importers 
could also simply self-declare on inventories, providing ample opportunity to 
falsify invoices and other records to evade taxes and facilitate trade-based 






























































money laundering (Korver, 2018). Another concern of freeports is the potential 
they pose in enabling trade-based money laundering.
5.2. Trade-based money laundering.
The main purpose of money laundering is to legitimise and conceal criminal profit 
(Naheem, 2015a; Zali and Maulidi, 2018, p. 44). Money-laundering methods are 
numerous. Illicit trade-based practices, for example, tend to operate within 
sophisticated global networks of transactions, which typically challenges domestic 
AML authorities to a greater degree, compared to other types of money laundering 
(Stack, 2015, p. 81). Trade-based money laundering (TBML) remains a significant 
threat to the stability and integrity of the global financial system. FATF (2020, p. 7) 
reported that the volume of global trade increased by 3% in 2018, while the value of 
global trade reached nearly USD 20 trillion.
The definition of TBML is widely disputed (see Naheem, 2015b; Soudijn, 2014; 
Sullivan and Smith, 2012). FATF (2006, p. 3) defined it as “the process of disguising 
the proceeds of crime and moving value through the use of trade transactions in an 
attempt to legitimise their illegal origin or finance their activities”. Naheem (2015b, p. 
514) argued that TMBL centres on the dishonest manipulation of trade invoices and
freight information to ship goods. However, FATF’s (2020, p. 11) recent report 
clarified that the aim of TBML is to transfer the money enabled by trading, rather 
than to move goods. Still, such schemes typically involve the misrepresentation of 
the quality, price, or quantity of imported or exported goods. TBML schemes also 
involve bogus shipments; multiple invoicing of the same shipment; and other 
methods to fabricate invoices, transfer funds, or to ship illicit goods, such as drugs 
and contraband (FATF, 2010; Neale, 2019). Freeports pose particular risk from 
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TBML because of the high volume of transactions occurring through freeports, 
combined with freeports’ reduced regulatory supervision (Moiseienko et al., 2020).
Additionally, Neale (2019, para. 18) and Simser (2013, p. 49) agreed that most 
international trade settlements occur through open merchant accounts. Here, the 
seller ships the goods and all related business documents to the trusted buyer, who 
then agrees to pay the seller’s invoice later. However, the banks completing the 
transactions on behalf of the merchants would typically have no awareness of the 
reasons behind the trade and would not have reviewed the underlying business 
documentation before processing the transaction (Neale, 2019; Simser, 2013). 
Arguably, banks are responsible for carrying out customer due diligence, including 
detecting and reporting suspicious transactions (as obliged by AML laws). Therefore, 
banks should also know the underlying detail of all global trade transactions that they 
transact (Neale, 2019).
The European Union’s Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD5), introduced in 
2018, amends earlier directives to widen the scope of institutions obliged to follow its 
rules and now includes freeports. Freeports are required to conduct customer due 
diligence, report suspicious transactions, and record beneficial ownership 
information (Helgadóttir, 2020; Korver, 2018; Sellick, 2020). All EU Member States 
were required to transpose the AMLD’s requirements into national law by 10 January 
2020 (Council Directive 2018/843/EU, 2018; Sellick, 2020). Freeports are also 
covered to some extent under the US Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) 
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) 
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However, freeports are not classified as ‘financial institutions’ under such regimes 
and are only regarded as obliged ‘non-financial institutions’ (Helgadóttir, 2020, pp. 
13-14; Korver, 2018, p. 6). This means freeports have no obligation to automatically 
share information with authorities. Freeports are also not required to inform 
authorities about the details of private commercial information that they do share 
(Helgadóttir, 2020). This represents a clear failing of AML rule. Freeports are 
inherently secret spaces where client confidentiality and discretion provided to 
businesses operating within freeports is of the upmost importance. Therefore, better 
transparency of freeports and strengthened laws are needed to combat TBML 
activities that occur through freeports.
6. Conclusion.
This article provides a critical insight into freeports’ offshore illicit trading operations. 
Freeports are innovative trading hubs that provide platforms for invigorating 
enterprise and economic growth, where businesses can enjoy several economic 
concessions (Moiseienko et al., 2020; Webb, 2020). Although the growth in freeports 
may have originally evolved from a desire to stimulate global investment by 
deregulating financial markets, some argue that freeports’ permanent storage 
spaces only act to stifle capital mobility (Lavissière and Rodrigue, 2017; Ogle, 2017; 
Post and Calvão, 2020; Schwarzkopf and Backsell, 2020). Nonetheless, freeports do 
seem to provide innovative trading advantages to enable businesses to thrive in 
today’s competitive global market (Winters and Holmes, 2020; Holmes, 2019; 
Stojanovic, 2020).
However, freeports can be abused for money-laundering and tax-evasion purposes. 
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corporate practices that thwart authorities’ efforts to trace illicit profits and recoup 
government taxes (FATF, 2014, 2018; Korver, 2018; Le Nguyen, 2018; Moiseienko 
et al., 2020; Post and Calvão, 2020). Freeports also enable trade-based money 
laundering by the falsifying of trade invoices to deceive authorities (FATF, 2020). 
The many international transactions occurring through freeports coupled with 
freeports’ lack of regulatory supervision poses notable challenges for government 
officials (Moiseienko et al., 2020).
Therefore, further government oversight is needed to curb illegal activity through 
freeport zones. Banks that facilitate the numerous international trade transactions 
need to be more alert to illicit trading and responsible for carrying out proper due 
diligence around freeport transactions (Neale, 2019; Simser, 2013). Although, recent 
legal regimes recognise the threat that freeports present by incorporating freeports 
within AML rules, there is still scope for freeports to operate without transparency. 
This article concludes that despite freeports’ trade offerings, stronger regulation is 
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